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ABSTRACT
This paper empirically analyzes how circumstances affect the creation of strategic
alliances in the pharmaceutical industry, and the form these alliances take. The models
introduced in this paper use the cost of capital and monitoring costs to predict the timing
of the deal, which in turn allows the prediction of the deal type. The deal type is then
used to predict payment types used in the deal. Deals are characterized by five payment
types; upfront, royalty, milestone, equity, and research payments. Deals are also
characterized by one of five deal types; co-development, license, acquisition, outsource,
and asset purchase. Each of these is a response to a specific contracting problem such as
cost of acquiring capital and asymmetric information.

The payment types used in

pharmaceutical alliances are chosen to efficiently produce monitoring or purchase assets
in the face of asymmetric information and to maximize firm profits.
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INTRODUCTION
The pharmaceutical industry has exhibited a major shift in business strategy over the past
few decades. In the late 1970's, large pharmaceutical firms began relying less on using
high-throughput screening of chemical libraries to find treatments for human diseases,
and relying more on structure-based drug design. This shift in strategy caused large
transition costs for the large pharmaceutical corporations, which were therefore slow to
respond to the changes. This created a cost advantage for smaller biotech firms. Small
biotech corporations were formed to take advantage of proprietary human capital, and
were able to adapt to this new style of biotechnology quickly and cheaply. When larger
firms successfully adapted to the transition, they enjoyed economies of scale and scope
due to their larger size and access to capital. This created superior efficiency when
compared to the smaller firms. The larger firms then merged with or acquired some
smaller firms in order to more efficiently use any proprietary information or pipeline held
by the smaller firm (Galambos & Sturchio, 1998). In other cases, firms formed alliances
to co-develop specific drugs or technologies, which took advantage of the smaller firm’s
research efficiency, and the larger firm’s low cost of capital. This paper uses data
collected from press releases to explore the makeup of pharmaceutical deals between
large pharmaceutical firms, smaller pharmaceutical firms called biotechs, and
universities. The model predicts the timing of alliances from the size of the firms
involved, and then predicts the type of deal and payments from the timing of the deal.
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PRIOR RESEARCH
The following is a review of works on contracting in the pharmaceutical industry. The
prior research in this area focuses on the cost advantages and nature of the industry which
make strategic alliances profitable, and the effects of these alliances after being
undertaken.

Galambos and Sturchio (1998) review the transition from pharmaceutical companies to
the strategic alliances of large pharmaceutical and small biotechnology firms.

The

authors of this paper suggest that biotechnology firms were able to prosper due to
transitions costs of big pharmaceutical firms when transitioning from chemical to
biological formulation of drugs. Originally, there was a random search of chemicals by
pharmaceutical firms to find useable medicines.

As technology improved, specific

problems could be solved based on more advanced knowledge of biology. This created
an opportunity for scientists to create new firms with proprietary human capital as the
larger pharmaceutical firms transitioned to biotechnology. The large pharmaceutical
firms invested heavily in biotechnology in the 1970s and 80s and integrated with
biotechnology firms to increase their knowledge base. The paper by Galambos and
Sturchio presents a background for the further examination of strategic alliances as a
profit maximizing technique.

Arora and Gambardella (1990), examine the complementarity of agreements between
firms, research agreements with universities, investments in the capital stock of biotechs,
2

and acquisition of biotechs. The authors conclude that the foundation for the agreements
between large and small pharmaceutical firms is the acquisition of some rights to a
specific downstream product or technology. In many cases, biotechs emerge only to
exploit a specific technology and have no intention of long term or broader research
goals. The research agreements between pharmaceutical firms and universities are based
on acquiring the use of basic scientific knowledge from the university. Acquisitions are
used to acquire the proprietary technologies of some smaller companies or to quickly add
a new sector to the larger firm's knowledge base.

Arora and Gambardella claim that investment in equity is an attempt of the large firm to
gain favor of the small firm in current and future rights to information and product
licensing. An investment in equity may also be a way of acquiring familiarity with the
work of the biotech. This investment in knowledge and repeat formal agreements may
prevent moral hazard. The strategies listed above each target a specific goal of the large
firm to acquire tangible or intangible assets to increase efficiency and productivity of
their firm.

They are therefore complementary, such that large firms may use each

strategy in combination towards a specific goal while these strategies do not seem to
necessarily be substitutes or work against one another.

My paper builds on the work done by Arora and Gambardella in the area of acquisitions
of small biotechs with propriety information. However, I disagree with their implication
that firms will create alliances with another firm simply to learn about the firm, or to gain
3

favor with the firm through repeated dealings. It is my hypothesis that firms will seek to
maximize profits regardless of previous deals. Profits will be maximized by dealing with
the low cost producer of capital or research.

Arora, Ashish, and Gambardella (2005) claim that bigger companies gain knowledge
about the smaller company by investing in equity. Again, this does agree with my
hypothesis that firms seek to maximize profits based on low cost production. These
authors suspect that by being a shareholder, they are privy to insider information on the
company, can keep track of it, and be more likely to capture deals. Information on public
companies is publicly available, and information on private companies should be made
available to potential investors in order to maximize the opportunities of the private firm.
Using an investor’s capital to buy equity in the firm being researched has a high
opportunity cost associated with it, since this capital can no longer be used to invest
elsewhere.

In the case that it is a privately held firm, or the client is researching several firms,
information can more cheaply be obtained from firms that specialize in gather that data,
such as recap.com, medtrack.com, datamonitor.com. This prevents repeated search costs
and therefore lowers overall costs of searching. Information on a firm may also be
obtained by researching the other deals that a firm has made (Nicholson 2005). The
information available through diligent research should be at a quality as high as
information obtained by a firm that has an equity interest in the firm being researched. If
4

this is not the case, then there is asymmetric information, which suggests inefficiency in
the market.

Arora, Ashish, and Gambardella go on to claim that an investor in a firm will be more
likely to benefit from economies of scope, since there will be sharing of research
information. There is no reason to believe that there will be knowledge sharing between
firms that is not specific to a contract unless the client firm acquires controlling interest in
the research firm, as in acquisitions.

The benefits from all shared knowledge are

therefore captured in the contract with no extra, uncontracted knowledge sharing between
firms. There may, however, be knowledge spillovers within a firm due to the acquisition
of new technologies.

Danzon, Nicholson, and Pereira, wrote Productivity in Pharmaceutical-Biotechnology
R&D: The Role of Experience and Alliances (2003) to develop the idea of the value of
having experience of forming and undertaking alliances. Their results suggest that returns
to investment vary significantly according to therapeutic category, and products which
are developed in alliances during phase 2 and 3 testing are more likely to be successful,
especially when the licensee is large. The authors go on to develop the idea that alliances
can be a way of obtaining experience in an area. Some firms may be taking on these
deals in order to increase the value of the firm or the value of their services in the future.
This hypothesis is supported by the finding that phase 2 testing is more likely to be
successful if developed with therapeutic category specific experience and by firms with
5

specific rather than general experience.

The authors’ data is acquired from ADIS

international and Windover.

The paper by Danzon, Nicholson, and Periera is useful in my research as support for the
hypothesis that later deals are associated with less risk of failure. Less risk of failure
leads to the prediction that the total payment will be larger, ceteris paribus, and payment
types will be chosen with less concentration on the reduction of monitoring costs.

Danzon, Epstein, and Nicholson, discuss the combination of firms in Mergers and
Acquisitions in the Pharmaceutical and Biotech Industries (2004). This research is a
starting point for the explanation of the observed trend in acquisitions in my paper. The
authors show that "mergers are a response to excess capacity due to anticipated patent
expirations and gaps in a company's product pipeline." For large firms, a gap in the
product pipeline means that human and physical capital are not being used efficiently.
When faced with an empty pipeline, a pharmaceutical corporation could reduce staff and
sell assets to avoid merging. This would involve the loss of quasi rents from investment
in human and physical capital (Oi, 1962). By buying another firm's pipeline through
merging or acquiring that firm, the purchasing firm can utilize their resources more
efficiently. Acquisition is therefore a mechanism to transfer assets to more efficient uses
or management, and may be cheaper than attempting to create them in-house. For the
smaller firm being merged or acquired, the merger is an exit strategy. Small firms,
defined here as greater than $20 million in sales, but less than $1 billion in enterprise
6

value have the propensity to be acquired if they are financially weak. Financially strong
firms are more likely not to engage in M&A at all.

Merged firms had slower growth than similar, unmerged, firms in the third year
following a merger, showing that although merging is a response to distress, it may not
be a solution. Small firms that merge have slower R&D growth than similar firms,
suggesting that integration may divert cash from R&D. Horizontal mergers are
rationalized on the basis of the research intensity undertaken by the pharmaceutical
industry, which averages R&D to sales ratio of 18% compared to 4% for the US
manufacturing industry overall (PhRMA).

Nicholson, Danzon, and McCullough continue the development of the idea of alliances
building firm value and evaluate the possibility of asymmetric information in the market
for pharmaceutical alliances in Biotech-Pharmaceutical Alliances as a Signal of Asset
and Firm Quality (2005). Asymmetric information will affect market valuation of firms.
The authors examine whether drugs developed in an alliance are more likely to succeed,
or whether there is a lemons problem. The lemons problem (Pisano, 1997) suggests that
the less successful drugs are out-licensed due to asymmetric information between
pharmaceutical firms. The data, however, does not support this. In 1998, biotechs raised
three times as much from alliances with pharmaceutical companies ($6.2 billion) as from
the private and public equity markets combined. This supports the hypothesis maintained
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in my paper, which states that deals are not made in order to sell off failing products, but
rather to take advantage of comparative advantage.

The analysis finds that biotech firms receive a 47% discount on their first deal relative to
firms that have signed at least two prior deals, and 28% on the second deal. This
discount is not consistent with the post deal performance of the drug. The authors
therefore reject the lemons hypothesis. The discount is due to asymmetric information
and making this deal, despite the discount, is valuable to the biotech because it signals
value to the financial market, and increases the value of subsequent deals. The authors
therefore find that there is value to the biotech of signaling to the financial market, but
since experienced biotechs continue to make alliances, there must also be some
advantage due to comparative advantage of different sized firms.

Aghion and Tirole wrote The Management of Innovation (1994) which discusses the cost
of capital as it applies to highly human capital intensive industries. They find that firms in
industries that require large amounts of human capital relative to physical and financial
capital will have research performed by independent units. Each aspect of production can
be performed by the firm with the comparative advantage, creating high competition
among researchers. This theory of comparative advantage and specialization due to cost
of capital and ownership of human capital is the foundation for creating a strategic
alliance in my paper.
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Lerner and Merges wrote The control of Technology Alliances: An Empirical Analysis of
the Biotechnology Industry (1998), to test the Aghion- Tirole theory that the researcher's
control will be positively correlated with the researcher's financial resources in the
biotechnology industry. This paper uses three case studies and a quantitative analysis of
200 alliances. The authors find that it is the researcher’s financial condition rather than
the interest of maximizing joint value. This supports the Aghion and Tirole theory that
control will be positively correlated with researcher’s financial capital.

Civan and Maloney seek to support their theory that drug development responds to
consumer demand in their paper The Determinants of Pharmaceutical Research and
Development Investments (2006). These authors find that characteristics of the disease
other than demand for the drug in the United States does not motivate the production of
research and development of drugs. Changes in policy that affect demand or quantity
demanded or supplied of drugs in the U.S. will affect drug development, and could
reduce the amount of drug development. Allowing the importation of drugs from other
countries at lower prices could be detrimental to drug development.

Civan and Maloney continue the development of their hypothesis by testing the effect of
prices of existing drugs on the number of drugs in the development pipeline in The Effect
of Price on Pharmaceutical R&D (2007).

The authors found a significant positive

correlation between prices and number of drugs in pipeline. As cheaper drugs are
imported to the United States from other countries, either as a patent infringement or due
9

to price discrimination, the drug pipeline will suffer. By looking at changes in prices of
drugs and pipeline drugs in specific disease markets, the authors find the elasticity of
supply of pipeline drugs to be between 28 and 49%. The authors therefore suggest that a
higher market price of drugs increases incentive to produce research and development,
and so the pharmaceutical market faces and upward sloping supply curve for research and
development. My paper discusses the falling costs of producing research due to alliances
with biotechs which have a comparative advantage in early stage development. The
papers by Civan and Maloney support the theory that alliances are necessary to maintain
competitiveness in the market.

Grabowski and Vernon claim in Consumer Protection Regulation in Ethical Drugs
(1977), that part of the cause of the shrinking number of pharmaceutical firms in the US
is that the more stringent regulation on the US pharmaceutical market is creating a barrier
to entry. This paper was written in 1977 before the biotech boom.

Grabowski, Vernon, and Thomas wrote Estimating the Effects of Regulation on
Innovation: an International Comparative Analysis of the Pharmaceutical Industry
(1978), and show that while R&D expenditures increase, new drug introductions
(including only new chemical entities, not new dosages or new brand names) decreased.
Possible causes of this are listed as;
1. Increased regulation of the industry due to the 1962 amendments to the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act
10

2. The effect is illusory because only ineffective new chemical entities have declined
3. A depletion or research opportunities
4. The thalidomide incident caused doctors and firms to be more cautious
5. Costs have risen as a result of advances in the technology of safety testing.

Their conclusions are that while costs in the US rose, costs in the UK which are not
affected by the 1962 amendments also rose significantly. This means that there may be a
depletion of research opportunities, but there is another force causing the decrease in
introductions in the US. These authors fail to capture the causes of the rising prices and
falling number of new chemical entities, but do show empirically that this is occurring.
Since ceteris paribus is violated by the uses of the chemical entities and the technology
used to create them, the analysis becomes more difficult. This paper is useful in my
research as support for the theory that new chemical entities become more expensive to
produce, after adjusting for inflation, in later years.

Cockburn, and Henderson write in Scale, Scope, and Spillovers: The Determinants of
Research Productivity in Drug Discovery (1996) that larger pharmaceutical companies
enjoy economies of scale and also economies of scope due to knowledge spillovers. A
firm with intellectual property and human capital can use these in the research for a
greater number of drugs or technologies than a smaller firm. This means that a larger
corporation can more cheaply produce drugs thanks to better access to cheap information,
marketing, capital, and equipment. This research is especially important in my analysis
11

of acquisitions. An acquisition or asset purchase may occur due to the purchaser’s
greater perceived potential profits. These greater profits stem from the lower costs
associated with economies of scale and scope.

Turning to contracting, there two seminal papers on the efficiency of contracting. Ronald
Coase claims in The Nature of the Firm (1937), that contracting is due to transactions
costs. He relates this to the purchase of fisher body by GM. Klein, Crawford and
Alchian add to the theory in Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the
Competitive Contracting Process, 1978. These authors write that a contracting firm may
be used rather than independent workers because the firm fears it will be cheated via a
hold up. Klein calls this “post contractual opportunistic behavior.” Klein claims this is
the reason GM bought Fisher Body.

Both cases are useful in my evaluation of

contracting in a strategic alliance with asymmetric information.
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DATA
The data analyzed in this paper was collected from Deloitte Recap LLC (Recap.com,
2007).

This is a subscription website that owns a proprietary, searchable dataset

comprised of press releases about pharmaceutical alliances. I read through the press
releases to obtain all public information on these alliances. Recap designated each
alliance as a co-development, license, acquisition, outsource, asset purchase or
distribution based on the information available. Each firm was designated by Recap as
large pharmaceutical, biotech, or university. The dataset consists of 270 pharmaceutical
deals. These deals span the five years of January 2003 to December 2007. The data are
only for the following diseases; diabetes, cardiovascular, and respiratory related drugs
and technologies. I have only included deals for which some financial information about
the deal was made available.

Financial data on the firms was gathered from the press releases, Google Finance, Yahoo
Finance, and CRSP and Compustat. The financial data of publicly traded firms is
required by the Securities and Exchange Commission to be made publicly available.
Market cap was found by multiplying stock price by number of shares. When obtaining
this data, many stock prices were available for the day that the deal took place, but some
were available monthly. In these cases, the closest date available was used. Some
privately owned firms may have some information available such that firms or investors
have information signaling the viability of current and future investments in that firm. In
the cases in which a firm is acquired, information about the price paid for that firm will
13

sometimes be available. Although the firm may have been acquired at a premium or
discount, the price paid is usually the best indication available of the value of that firm. In
many cases, no data was available concerning the market cap of private firms, so these
data are treated as missing.

Firm types are described in this paper as researcher and client, or purchaser and
acquired firm. The researcher is the developer of the drug or technology in the early
stages of development, and in every case except an outsourced research deal, is the owner
of the intellectual property.

The client in these cases is the firm which pays the

researcher for rights to the intellectual property being developed.

In the case of

acquisitions, the firms are described as purchaser and acquired firms, rather than
researcher and client.

There are several types of payments used in these pharmaceutical alliances. These are
not mutually exclusive payments, so may occur alone or together.

The client will

contract using these payments to prevent moral hazard and align the incentives of the
researcher with its own. The researcher, if it owns the intellectual property (IP), will
attempt to sell its intellectual property for economic profit after accounting for cost of
capital and drug-specific risk.

The types of payments paid by the client to the researcher are organized as equity,
royalty, milestone, research, and upfront payments. Equity is a purchase of ownership in
14

the researcher. Equity is a share of a firm, and in the case that equity in the researcher is
purchased, the equity provides the client with some profit sharing in successes of the
researcher, and the researcher with capital. Research payments are cash payments by the
client to the researcher in the case that the client owns the intellectual property, but
wishes to outsource some of the research work to another firm. Upfront payments are
cash payments from the client to the researcher without contractual conditions being met.
Milestone payments are payments by the client to the researcher in exchange for
contractual requirements being met. Royalty payments are payments by the client to the
researcher to provide the researcher with a residual claim on the product being produced.
Acquisition payments may consist of cash payments and payments in terms of shares of
stock of the acquiring firm. These payments are separated from other types of payments
as acquisition payments.

In this study, five types of deals are evaluated; license, asset purchase, co-development,
outsource and acquisition1. These deal types are mutually exclusive. Licenses are the
purchase of the use of a specified drug or technology, whether exclusively or nonexclusively licensed worldwide or in a geographic region. Licenses usually mean that
some ownership rests with the original holder of the intellectual property. An asset
purchase is the purchase of a product or group of products, which could be drugs,
technologies, or other capital. No ownership rests with the seller in this case, so this is an
outright purchase.
1

Co-development is an effort between two firms which involves

Of the 270 deals, there were 8 deals that did not fit into these five categories.
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payments from the client firm to the researcher, and transfer of some of the intellectual
property rights from the researcher to the client. An acquisition is the purchase of all
equity of a firm. Outsource is a deal for which the intellectual property holder outsources
some work to another firm, usually in exchange for cash or milestone payments.
Outsource is a special case in which the client is the intellectual property holder.

One of the characteristics of the deals involves the stage of development of the research.
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA), imposes strict controls on the development
and testing of new pharmaceuticals to ensure safety and efficacy.

It is important to

understand the course that a drug or technology follows during the development and
testing phases. On average, it will take 10-15 years for an experimental drug to get from
the lab to patients. One out of five thousand compounds make it to human testing from
preclinical testing. Of these, one in five is approved for sale. This process costs, on
average, 802 million dollars per new medicine (Tufts, 1998).

The first step is preclinical testing, which involves laboratory and animal studies. The
specific stages include formulation of new compounds, determining a lead molecule, and
discovery of a potentially usable new drug. This process takes about 6.5 years. After this,
an investigational new drug application (IND) is filed at the FDA. If the FDA does not
disapprove of this IND within 30 days, the IND becomes effective.

16

The second step is clinical trials. The phase one and two trials take about 1.5 and 2-3
years, respectively, and involve a few healthy and few patient volunteers. Phase three
takes about 3.5 years, and is much more expensive to undertake, and includes a large
number of patient volunteers to confirm effectiveness and monitor possible long term
adverse reactions (PhRMA).

If all of these phases are passed, the firm requests a New Drug Application (NDA) or
Biologic License Application (BLA). A BLA is used when the new formulation is a
therapeutic DNA plasmid product, therapeutic synthetic peptide product of 40 or fewer
amino acids, monoclonal antibody product for in vivo use, or therapeutic recombinant
DNA-derived product (FDA, 2008). The firm gathers all of its information, sometimes
100,000 pages or more, and submits this to the FDA, which analyzes the information
over the period of about 1.5 years. If the FDA approves the NDA/BLA, the drug is
approved, and may be available for physicians to prescribe. The producing company
must continue to run tests and send periodic reports to the FDA.

17

CONTRACTING
The maintained hypothesis of this paper is that firms do not always have the most cost
effective means to fully develop a new drug or technology from start to finish. A firm
that has initiated research or development of a new drug could attempt to continue
development on its own by using its own resources, obtaining capital privately from
venture capitalists, incurring debt, or publicly by selling shares of equity. The other
option is to enter into an agreement with another firm, which could include continuing
the development as an alliance, selling the existing assets, or being acquired completely.
The decisions made will be based on the likelihood of success of development, the cost to
the researching firm of acquiring capital, and the cost of information gathering and
monitoring of the researching firm. If a contract is made, the contract will consist of a
nexus of payments which attempt to align the incentives of the client and researching
firm.

Table 1 shows the possible observations at each stage of an alliance. The IP owner and
the cost of capital of the firms involved are taken as exogenous. After this, timing can be
predicted by the model set up in this paper. The model then predicts type of deal from
the timing, and payment types from the deal type.

18

Table 1 – Data Observations
IP Owner
Researcher
or
Client

Cost of
Capital
High
or
Low

Timing of
Deal
Early
or
Late

Type of deal

Payment Types

Acquisition,
or
Outsource,
or
Co-development,
or
Asset Purchase,
or
License

Equity,
Royalty,
Milestone,
Research,
Upfront

It is first important to note the owner of the intellectual property. If the researcher owns
the intellectual property (IP), then some part of the IP will be sold to the client as part of
the deal, and financing will be provided to the researcher. If the client owns the IP, then
it is likely that the client is outsourcing some of the research to the researcher. This type
of deal is referred to as an outsource deal. I do not have information on the IP owner, so I
assume that an outsource deal is due to the client owning the IP.

The model proposed in this paper predicts that the cost of capital is a strong predictor of
the timing of deals. Aghion and Tirole (1998) wrote that in a human capital intensive
industry such as biotechnology, the large firms will purchase research from smaller firms
which have a comparative advantage in production. The large firms, with cheap access to
capital, are the buyer of research, and the biotechs specialize in specific areas. The large
firm, thanks to large amounts of financial capital, has a comparative advantage in
organizing the smaller firms, and marketing and distributing the products once they have
19

been approved by the FDA. A small firm with very little capital to invest into the
development of a drug (Lerner & Merges, 1998) should therefore be interested in forming
a strategic alliance with a larger firm that can cheaply acquire capital, as well as the
larger firm being interested in acquiring the IP from the smaller firm.

Shirking costs are associated with all contracting arrangements and are come into play in
the decision to form a drug development alliance. The larger firms are interested in doing
business with the smaller firms partly because shirking costs are reduced when a smaller,
more efficient command and control exists. Fewer managers and better alignment of
incentives creates a more efficient system of production. In franchising of stores, much
like the outsourcing of research explored in this paper, we see large firms passing control
to individual owner-operators. The firm expects that the increase in efficiency and
subsequent high royalty payments received will offset the forgone profits from operating
the store directly.2

Monitoring costs (Barzel, 1982) are the costs of overseeing work done by another firm.
In the case of strategic alliances, a large part of this monitoring cost will be measurement
of the value of production of the researcher firm. The researching firm may also take
payments, but not expend resources to produce a valuable product, thereby creating a
moral hazard problem. Payment types may be selected for the contract in order to reduce

2

(Kaufmann & Lafontaine, 1994), (Klein, Crawford, & Alchian, 1978) (Mathewson &
Winter, 1985) (Rubin, 1978)
20

monitoring costs, such that the researcher has incentive to reduce shirking and produce a
valuable product. Monitoring costs may also be reduced by selling equity to a single
buyer or creating an alliance with a single buyer such that only a single buyer must
expend resources to monitor the researcher (Brealey & Myers, 1991).

The value of a product may differ by firm. In the case that neither firm has capital,
monitoring, or shirking cost advantages, a deal may occur due to differences in value of
the product. This means that the product maybe sold or licensed to the highest valuing
firm to profit both firms. This will maximize the value of the IP. The transfer of the IP
may be motivated by the gain or loss of human capital, such as the gain or loss to the firm
of a scientist or group of scientists. In a simple example, a group of diseases specific
specialists may be hired to a small firm and away from another small firm.

The small

firm that acquired the human capital may choose to license or purchase an IP from the
other firm in order to continue research in the area in which it now has a comparative
advantage.

The previous few paragraphs have explained that the characteristics of drug development
alliances will be driven by cost of capital, difference in value of the commercial potential
of the research, and the contractual issues of shirking and monitoring. The next several
sections of this paper will describe how these costs lead to the formation of the timing of
the deal, type of deal, and payment types used in the deal.
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Contracting- Prediction of Timing of Deal
The timing of deals will be driven by cost of capital, monitoring costs, shirking costs, and
differences in value. To further analyze this by client and researcher type, Table 2
depicts where we can expect to see deviations in these costs between small and large
clients and researchers that drive the timing of the deal.

Table 2 - Analysis of Cost of Capital, Monitoring Costs, and Shirking for a Small
Researcher and Large Client
Cost of Capital; low for client, higher for researcher than in late deal
Early Monitoring; early deal occurs if monitoring and measurement costs are low
for client
Shirking; low for researcher, high for client
Cost of Capital; low for client, lower for researcher than in early deal 3
Late

Monitoring; late deal will occur if monitoring and measurement costs are
high for client
Shirking; low for researcher, high for client

Early deals are driven by cost of capital, monitoring, and shirking costs. When the
researcher is the IP owner, during any point in the development process, the researching
3

Although cost of capital is noted as “high” for researcher, and “low” for client in both early and late
cases, it is of note that this is a sliding scale such that the researcher is expected to have a high cost of
capital if engaging in a late deal, but not as high as will be observed if the researcher engages in an early
deal.
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firm may decide to sell the existing assets, be acquired, or take on a partner in the
development. Taking on a partner requires the small firm to sell some of the IP. This
leaves the small researcher with a smaller investment at risk of loss, but smaller profits in
the case of a success. When the small researching firm finds it more profitable to sell
some IP in exchange for operating capital rather than attempting to borrow the capital,
the model predicts that an early stage strategic alliance will be observed.

In addition to easy access to financial capital, larger firms enjoy economies of scale in
manufacturing, and economies of scope in distribution and marketing.

Having the

avenues already set up, larger firms can more cheaply add another drug to the market. In
this case, these two firms could form a symbiosis to cheaply and profitably create a new
product by specializing in the area in which they have a comparative advantage.

Monitoring costs of the researcher by the client are described as high when the output of
the researcher is costly to measure. This problem creates incentive for the client to
contract a payment structure that induces the researcher to monitor itself. If it is too
costly to measure the product or create a contract, the client may choose to wait until later
stages of development to make a deal, in which case the value of the product will be
easier to measure. Relative to other deals, ceteris paribus, one for which an early deal is
observed has lower monitoring costs
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Shirking costs are lower for the small researcher than would be the case, ceteris paribus,
for a large researcher. Internal monitoring is less efficient when performed by salaried
managers or managers with a small residual claim to a large firm, than by managers with
a large residual claim of a small firm or owner operators. This is because the marginal
benefit of an hour of work is higher to the worker when that worker owns a larger
residual claim (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972).

Late deals are also driven by cost of capital, monitoring, and shirking costs, but the model
predicts a late deal to occur between small researcher and large client in the case that the
small researcher has a higher market cap relative to other small researchers, or
measurement of the product is costly.

The size of the researcher carries more information than simply small or large. A very
small researcher is predicted to seek an alliance much earlier than a relatively large
researcher. Even in cases that the researcher is relatively small when compared to the
client, the researcher’s cost of capital may be low enough to support development into
late phase testing before taking on an alliance with a client that has a comparative
advantage in marketing and distribution. This paper will develop a model that will
predict likelihood of an early deal compared to a late deal based on market cap, which is
an instrumental variable for cost of capital.
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Measurement costs of assets are lower in later stages. If the deal occurred in a late stage,
that may be a signal that the cost of evaluating the product in an early stage was higher
than the benefit of doing so, so the client chose not to invest until evaluation became less
expensive. There may therefore be a correlation between late stage deals and higher
monitoring costs, although the late stage deal is not the cause of high monitoring costs.

Deals for which there is not a small researcher and large client will be driven due to a
difference in value of products by the two firms. A small researcher, small client deal
will happen early if it is an outsource deal, or late if there is a transfer of assets or licenses
due to a difference in value of the assets between the two firms. It is plausible that a
small firm will buy a license from another firm, regardless of the size of that second firm,
if that license is necessary to complement or complete development of a pipeline drug.

For a large researcher and large client deal, the transaction takes place due to the differing
valuation of the asset between the two firms. The difference in value may stem from the
differing use of the drug. In the case that a researcher has found a new use for a molecule
or technology that has been patented by another firm, the researcher will acquire or
license the IP to use for the new indication. Most other cases will involve the researcher
using the IP to complete a pipeline drug or technology.

If the sizes of the large client and large researcher are relatively similar, there will not be
a large enough difference in cost of capital to cause a deal. Due to the lack of substantial
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difference in cost of capital, the model predicts that the researcher will not take on an
early deal. The researcher will complete the development and testing of the product, and
will engage in a late deal if offered a price for the asset or a license which is estimated to
result in economic profit.

Contracting – Prediction of the Type of Deal
The above analysis predicts the timing of deals. The model predicts that the type of deal
will be determined by the timing of the deal.

An early deal will involve higher

monitoring and measurement costs due to asymmetric information and high likelihood of
failure of the product. The contract created for an early deal will involve a structure and
payment types that align incentives and lower monitoring costs. Late deals will involve
products which are easier to measure. These late deals will have a contract structure that
is oriented towards cash payments to transfer the ownership of an IP rather than incentive
alignment and monitoring.

Outsource deals are deals in which the client owns the IP, and is outsourcing research to
firms that have a comparative advantage in its production. These deals usually happen
early, but can happen early or late and are easy to measure and monitor. In this case, it is
arguable that the timing of the deal, the deal type, and the payment type are determined
simultaneously by the client.

26

Co-development deals consist of two firms investing resources into the joint development
of a product. The cause of this type of deal is the high cost of capital faced by the
researching firm. A very high cost of capital, as discussed in the previous section, may
cause the strategic alliance to occur early. An early strategic alliance, if not an outsource
deal, is a deal in which the client provides funding and the researcher completes early
stage development, which is called co-development. It would be illogical to purchase the
asset in the early stages, since the researcher owns the human capital which is producing
the asset, and the smaller size of the researcher indicates lower shirking costs, so lower
costs of early stage development.

An asset purchase is the outright purchase of another firm’s human or physical capital,
drug, or technology. The seller maintains no residual claim. This product is likely to be
approved or near approval, since it would make more sense to co-develop if the product
were in early stages. The purchase may also be of a firm’s entire series of drugs or
technology, which we cannot describe as “early” or “late” since there are varying degrees
of completion of pipeline drugs and technologies. If another firm is already producing
products like it, or already have avenues of production set up, the purchasing firm may
achieve economies of scale and produce with lower cost. The purchasing firm may also
be able to market the product with other products like it, thereby achieving economies of
scope.
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In the case of a license, the seller maintains some residual claim. The seller receives
some payment in exchange for the buyer to use or sell a drug or technology for a specific
indication or in a specified geographic market. These products are approved or near
approval. Like asset purchases, it would make more sense to co-develop if the product
were in the early stages. The buyer may be any size firm, using the drug or technology to
complete their product or use it for a different purpose than it is currently approved. The
seller may receive royalties on sales as the residual claim. These royalties provide the
seller with incentive to maintain the value of the license. By selling a license rather than
an asset purchase, the seller maintains some rights and may continue development of the
licensed drug or technology, and re-license an improved version.

Klein, Crawford, and Alchian claim that when one firm has invested resources, in this
case the client, there is the potential for a hold-up, which they call “post contractual
opportunistic behavior.” In an attempt to minimize risk of loss through this type of
problem, the client will contract with payment types that minimize monitoring costs, and
align incentives between the two firms. Table 3 shows which payments we are likely to
see given both timing and deal type.

Contracting - Deal Type Determines Payments Types
The model predicts that payment types are determined by deal type. Because the model
predicts that the deal type is determined directly by the timing of the deal, and the timing
is determined by the cost of capital and monitoring costs, all of these attributes are
28

captured when predicting payment type. All deals involve the transfer of some monetary
asset for some intellectual property or services. Acquisitions are made up of payments
from the purchaser to the acquired firm for the acquired firm’s assets. The payments can
consist of cash or equity in the acquiring firm. These are called acquisition payments in
this paper.

Because these payments are used in every acquisition and there is no

associated timing with acquisitions, the analysis of acquisitions is treated separately.
Similarly, outsource deals involve some cash payment generally on a periodic basis over
the life of the research contract. These payments are designated as research payments.

For co-development, asset purchases, and license agreements, I expect that there will be
some payment upfront, and for co-development and license agreements, some payment
through the life of the contract. When the upfront payment is cash paid at one time, and
is not a research payment, I call the payment upfront. For some deals, the client will buy
an equity share in the research firm for an upfront payment of cash. I call these payments
equity. For many of these deals, these payments will be extended over the life of the
contract. One way this is designated in the financial press is by the use of the word
milestone payments. These are payments that are made when certain events occur in the
development of the IP. I label these payments as milestone.

Alternatively, for some

deals, the extended payments will take the form of royalties on the sale of the IP to users.
I call these payments royalties. Table 3 displays the type of payments predicted to be
used, the reason for their use, and the timing in which they are expected to be observed.
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Table 3 - Payment Type by Type of Deal
Acquisition

Outsource

Co-develop

Asset

License

Purchase
Equity5,

Early

Milestone6
Late

Acquisition
Payments

Research
payment

4

(Generally

Royalty7,

Upfront

8

Upfront ,

Upfront,
Royalty

Milestone

early)

Outsource deals are deals in which the client owns the IP, unlike other deal types, and
outsources research to another firm that can perform it more cheaply. This is low-level
work for which the value is relatively easy to measure, so cash payments can be made
upfront.

Early deals in which the researcher owns the IP, but has a high cost of capital, are
predicted to be co-development deals. These deals are the exchange of early financing to
the researcher for late phase IP to the client. In this type of early deal, there will exist a
high cost of measurement of the product being produced, and a high risk of failure of the
product. Equity purchases are likely to occur in this case. The equity purchase allows
4

Research payments are cash payments by the client to the researcher in the case that the client owns the intellectual property.

5

Equity is a purchase of ownership in the researcher.

6

Milestone payments are payments by the client to the researcher in exchange for contractual requirements being met.

7

Royalty payments are payments by the client to the researcher to provide the researcher with a residual claim on the product being
produced.

8

Upfront payments are cash payments from the client to the researcher without contractual conditions being met.
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the investing firm to share profits without incurring prohibitive measurement costs
(Barzel, 1982), and without being able to accurately estimate the value of the product
being developed ex ante. Any profitable technology or product that results from the
investment will benefit the investing firm.

In co-development deals for which the client is able to more easily measure the product,
milestone payments will be used to monitor the researcher’s progress. Like equity and
royalties, milestone payments provide monitoring through financial means.

The

researcher is contractually obligated to meet specific goals to receive payment, and may
be punished if it fails to do so. Milestone payments may be used in early or late deals as
a source of monitoring and financing. As the financing is a prize for completed work,
rather than an upfront payment to provide the work, milestones are likely to be used as a
complement to another type of financing such as equity or upfront payments.

If the

goals are met, the milestones are paid to the researcher. If the researcher fails to produce
research in a timely manner, the contract stipulates a punishment.

For later co-development deals, or for co-development deals that involve an easily valued
product, equity payments may be replaced by royalty and upfront payments. Royalty
payments, like equity payments, are intended to resolve problems associates with
asymmetric information. Royalty payments, however, are specific to a single product,
rather than all products of a firm, so will be more profitable to the researcher than equity
payments in the case that the product is a success. The researcher receives a residual
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claim to the product, and therefore gains incentive to ensure its viability in the
marketplace. This effectively lowers the costs to the client of measuring the value of the
product and monitoring the researcher in the face of asymmetric information.

Upfront payments may be required by the researcher in a co-development deal in addition
to some combination of royalty, milestone, and equity payments. Upfront payments are
cash payments without the contractual obligation associated with milestone payments.
This is guaranteed payment to the researcher, usually supplied to the researcher only in
the case that the product is late in development. It is therefore easier to value and has a
low risk of failure.

In co-development deals, the contract usually stipulates that the ownership of the
intellectual property reverts back to the researcher if the client fails to make progress in
testing, development, and production. This provides incentive to the client to continue
development in a timely manner. Timely production is valuable to the researcher, since
the researcher may receive royalties or some revenue stream upon manufacture and sale
of the product.

Asset purchases are purchases for which no residual ownership rights are left with the
seller. These deals are therefore predicted to be paid in cash. In the case that milestone
payments are used, a contract exists that requires the researcher with a nearly complete
asset to complete the asset before ownership transfer.
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The licensing of a product is the purchase of some rights, but a residual claim rests with
the seller. Licensing of a product involves some asymmetric information, as the producer
of the license may own the human capital that produced the IP. The patent life of the
product may be difficult to measure by the client, such that a license involving profit
sharing will be preferred to a cash payment. The client will therefore be faced with
incentive to incorporate payments that reduce monitoring and measurement costs.
Royalty payments leave a residual claim to revenues with the researcher, providing the
researcher with incentive to create a valuable product. Upfront payments will likely also
be required by the researcher as a source of upfront financing to recoup expenses and
finance future endeavors.

Contracting – Acquisitions
As an alternative to co-development or an asset purchase, a larger firm may decide to
acquire a smaller firm. The chance of an acquisition increases if the larger firm wishes to
buy a pipeline or the human capital to either create a new division in its own firm or fill a
gap in its production line. Purchasing the assets and pipeline of a smaller firm may be
cheaper than attempting to co-develop with the firm and monitor their actions. An
acquisition can also reduce monitoring costs in the interest of maintaining the value of the
patent which was purchased or developed with another firm. If the human capital is not
absorbed, there is a chance that the smaller firm will create a patent that trumps the
previous patent bought or co-owned by the larger firm.
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The larger firms are more likely to have multiple uses of the technology acquired. The
technology may improve the production or application of several products, rather than the
relatively few for which it was designed by the acquired firm. These multiple uses create
economies of scale for the acquiring firm.

The model I set forth here predicts that smaller firms, with their higher cost of capital,
will be acquired by relatively larger firms. Acquisitions are the purchase by one firm of
all equity in another firm. This purchase can be completed with the buyer paying by cash
or by transferring equity from the acquiring firm to the owners of the acquired firm, or
some combination of these payments. These cash and equity payments are referred to as
“acquisition payments” throughout the paper, so as not to be confused with equity
payments from the client to the researcher.

Because of the difference in payment

structure and there being no phase of testing associated with acquisitions, these deals are
analyzed separately from all other deal types.
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ANALYSIS OF THE DATA
In the following few sections, the data is analyzed in the same order as discussed in the
previous sections. First, summary data is introduced. After this, the timing of the deal is
analyzed as a function of researcher market cap. Next, the type of deal is analyzed as a
function of the timing of the deal. The types of payments are analyzed as a function of
the type of deal. Finally, acquisitions are analyzed separately as a function of researcher
market cap.
Marginal effects from a logistic or multinomial logistic regression are used in many of
these tables, as noted in the table titles. The marginal effects were obtained using a code
in a statistical analysis program which calculates the average of discrete and partial
changes over all observations, rather than computing the marginal effects at the means of
the variables. This will be especially helpful when the independent variable is a dummy
variable.
Table 4 contains information about deal types by payment types, regardless of whether
timing data were available. Table 5 contains data on all timing data known for the deals.
There were not timing data for all observations, so the summation of early and late deals
for each deal type in Table 5 may not match the total number of deals in Table 4. Table 6
contains the number of times the client and researcher were observed to be a large
pharmaceutical firm, a biotech, or a university. Table 7 is a table of deals by partner.
This is the number of deals that occurred for each combination of client type and
researcher type.
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Table 4 - Deal Types by Payment Types

Acq
Total

Equity Royalty Milestone Research Upfront Payment

Acquisition

46

0

0

0

0

0

46

Asset Purchase

39

9

13

10

0

31

0

115

32

58

84

21

72

0

55

6

28

28

1

28

0

Outsource

7

1

0

3

3

1

0

Option

2

2

1

1

0

1

0

Distribution

6

0

1

1

0

1

0

270

50

101

127

25

133

46

Co-Development
License

Total
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Table 4A - Deal Types by Payment Types – Early Phase

Acq
Total
Asset Purchase

Equity Royalty Milestone Research Upfront Payment
7

3

3

2

0

6

0

Co-Development

71

21

40

52

17

40

0

License

16

1

9

9

1

6

0

Outsource

2

0

0

0

1

0

0

Option

2

2

1

1

0

1

0

Distribution

2

0

0

0

0

0

0

100

27

53

64

19

53

0

Total

Table 4B - Deal Types by Payment Types – Late Phase

Acq
Total

Equity Royalty Milestone Research Upfront Payment

Asset Purchase

16

5

6

5

0

14

0

Co-Development

34

10

15

30

3

30

0

License

35

4

17

19

0

20

0

Outsource

3

1

0

2

2

1

0

Option

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Distribution

3

0

1

1

0

1

0

91

20

39

57

5

66

0

Total
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Table 5 - Deal Type by Phase of Testing
Early

Late

Asset Purchase

7

16

Co-Development

71

34

License

16

35

Outsource

2

3

Option

2

0

Distribution

2

3

100

91

Total

Notes: Early is before phase 2 testing. Timing is not known
for all deals. Acquisition deals are omitted because multiple
products are being acquired. Timing for acquisitions is
therefore not defined

Table 6 - Deals by Type of Client and Researcher
Client

Researcher

Large Pharma

131

Large Pharma

Biotech

124

Biotech

University
Total

15

20
247

University

270

3

Total

270

Table 7 – Deals by Partner
Client Pharma

Client Biotech

Client University

Researcher Pharma

15

5

0

Researcher Biotech

114

118

15

2

1

0

Researcher University
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Analysis - Timing of Deal as a Function of Size of Firm
The model predicts that the timing of the deal will be a function of the size of the
researching firm {Timing(Rsize, e)}. Summary statistics of the market cap of researchers
and clients for which timing of the deal is known are presented in Table 8. In Table 9,
The tabulations of observations from biotech and pharma researchers and clients and
shown for each of the three main deal types. These numbers give some indication of the
significance of the results found in Table 11. Table 10 predicts the results of table 11,
which presents the results of a logistic regression of market cap on the early dummy
variable.

Table 8 - Summary Statistics of Firm Market Cap
Obs

Mean

Median Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Researcher Market Cap

102

8538.23

406.13 26602.84

8.68

193854.9

Client Market Cap

112 36402.58

10415.42 58998.25

4.14

339408.6

Notes: These statistics do not include observations for acquisitions, nor observations without timing data. Values are in millions of
US dollars.
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Table 9 - Tabulation of Observations for which Timing and Market Cap Data
are Known.
Co-development
Client Pharma

Client Biotech

Client

License

49

14

(51952.77)

(35010.04)

19

26

9

(17072.85)

(9212.48)

(520.53)

68 observations

Mean

(42206.91)

Researcher

Researcher
Biotech

3

Client/Researcher

6
(87315.47)

15 observations
(35238.5)
2

(51550.39)

(68117.53)

53

23

7

(3835.52)

(1001.09)

59

26

9

(5991.39)

(11252.67)

(24311.51)

121.878

58.926

44.766

(833.77)

Researcher Mean

40 observations
(23659.11)

6

Pharma

Asset Purchase

(105898)

Ratio Mean
Client/Researcher Min: 0.020

Min: 0.004

Min: 0.015

Ratio Range

Max: 1182.024

Max: 435.331

Max: 223.551

35 observations

11 observations

7 observations

Mean market cap in parentheses.
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Table 10 – Prediction of Marginal Effects from a Logistic Regression of Client and
Researcher Market Cap on Early Dummy

Dependent Variable: Early Dummy
Independent Variable:
Log Client Mkt Cap

Positive

(millions of $)
Log Researcher Mkt Cap

Negative

(millions of $)

The model predicts that the log client market cap will have a positive coefficient. This is
the prediction that larger client firms will tend to make earlier deals. This is because
larger clients should be interested in creating a co-development deal with smaller firms.
These larger firms have a lower cost of capital, and can afford the early stage, high risk,
high return investments. Later deals are predicted to involve a mix of large and small
clients, since some small and mid-sized firms will be interested in licensing and
purchasing assets from researching firms. This can be to complete a pipeline or make use
of economies of scope of the purchased or licensed technology.

The model also predicts that log researcher market cap will have a negative coefficient.
This is the prediction that smaller researcher firms will tend to make earlier deals. These
researcher firms act in this way because their cost of capital is higher than the larger
firms’. The smaller firms, at some point in development, either fail to acquire new
operating capital, or find it too costly. When the marginal cost of acquiring capital
exceeds the marginal benefit, the researcher may engage in a co-development deal. It is
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of note that the considerations in marginal decision making include firm-specific risk
aversion and measurement costs of the value of the product being developed.

Table 11 – Marginal Effects from a Logistic Regression of
Client and Researcher Market Cap on Early Dummy

Dependent Variable: Early Dummy
Independent Variable:
Log Client Mkt Cap
(millions of $)

(1)

(2)

(3)

0.019

0.039

(0.320)

(0.110)

Log Researcher Mkt Cap

-0.092

-0.142

(millions of $)

(0.000) a

(0.000) a

Observations
2

Pseudo R

112

102

0.006

0.122

55
0.340

Notes: p-values are in parentheses, a=significantly different from zero at the 1% significance
level. b= significantly different from zero at the 5% significance level, c= significantly different
from zero at the 10% significance level. Any observation for which timing data was unknown
was dropped. Acquisition deals were dropped. Only 55 observations simultaneously have data on
timing, researcher market cap, and client market cap.

The regressions in Table 11 use all deals for which timing data is known, which excludes
acquisition deals. The first regression utilizes log client market cap in millions as the
independent variable, which is not very predictive. The second regression uses the log of
researcher market cap in millions of dollars. Log market cap was used rather than market
cap because the probability of observing an early deal, given a smaller researcher market
cap, rises at a decreasing rate.
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Regression three combines the independent variables. The number of observations here
is only 55 because there are only 55 observations for which both client and researcher
market cap are simultaneously known. Results are relatively significant, and Pseudo R2 is
high. The interpretation of the marginal effects result for log researcher market cap is
that a 100% increase in researcher market cap will decrease the likelihood of observing
an early deal by 14.2% when compared to a late deal. As the client market cap increases
by 100%, the likelihood of observing an early deal increases by 3.9%.

The significance of the marginal effects of log researcher market cap are greater than
those for log client market cap, and 100% change in researcher market cap has a greater
effect on likelihood of observing an early deal than a 100% change in client market cap.
These results agree with the model’s prediction9 that an early deal will be undertaken
primarily due to the researcher’s cost of capital.

Analysis - Type of Deal as a Function of Timing
The model predicts that the type of deal will be partially determined by timing of deal
{Deal(Timing(Rsize,e),e)}. A researching firm will choose the timing of the deal based
on its own cost of capital.

Other factors, such as firm-specific risk of failure,

measurement costs, and how the drug or technology being considered will compliment or
substitute other drugs, technologies, or pipelines currently help by the client firm, will
weigh heavily in the decision of deal type, however these factors are not observed in my
9

See the explanation of Table 2 and Table 10 for more on this model.
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dataset. Because of the importance of some of these missing data, I regress deal type on
timing, which is a function of researcher size, rather than simply regressing deal type on
researcher size. In this way, I capture some of the factors influencing timing that are not
available in my dataset.

Table 12 – Predicted Marginal Effects from a Multinomial Logistic Regression of
Deal Type on Early Dummy
Dependent Variable: Deal Type
Co-development

License

Outsource

Asset Purchase

Independent Variable:
Early Dummy

+

-

+

-

Table 12 presents the predictions of the results for the marginal effects from a logistic
regression of deal type on the early dummy variable. This is the prediction of deal type
based on the observation of an early deal. I expect to observe a positive coefficient for
the early dummy when the dependant variable is co-development and outsource. This is
because co-development and outsource deals occur early in development of drugs and
technologies. There exist two major reasons for co-development deals being likely to
occur as early deals rather than late in phase testing. First, the early deals involve
products which are more likely to fail before approval than products in late deals, so the
type of alliance made between the firms should align incentives in the face of high
measurement costs. Secondly, the researcher holds ownership of the human capital that
created the product, so it would be more efficient for the researcher to continue early
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phase development.

A co-development deal allows the researcher to continue

development, but transfer intellectual property to the client later in development or
testing. The results of the logistic regression should indicate a high likelihood that if an
early deal is observed, the deal will be a co-development.

I expect to observe a negative coefficient for license and asset purchase deal types. The
client firm will be unlikely to license a product that is in the early stages of development
since it is hard to measure the value of the product, and the product is probably not ready
for use. Asset purchases are similarly unlikely to occur in early stages, but the client may
acquire some early stage products during the acquisition of a pipeline. The other factors
that determine whether a license or asset purchase is chosen are attributes of the client
firm which are not observed in my dataset. When creating or expanding a division, the
client firm may choose an asset purchase of human and physical capital, as well as
intellectual property. If completing a product and a patented piece is missing, then the
model predicts that a license is more likely.
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Table 13 – Average Marginal Effects from a Multinomial Logistic
Regression of Deal Type on Timing
Dependent Variable: Deal Type (dummy)

Independent Variable:
Early Dummy

Co-development

License

Asset Purchase

(1)

(2)

(3)

0.355

-0.138

-0.071

(0.054) c

(0.157)

(0.058) c
Observations

179

Pseudo R2

0.071

Notes: p-values are in parentheses, a=significantly different from zero at the 1% significance level. b=
significantly different from zero at the 5% significance level, c= significantly different from zero at the 10%
significance level.

In Table 13 (columns 1-3), the marginal effects from a single multinomial logistic
regression of deal type dummy variables on timing dummy variables are shown.
Outsource deals were not used because of too few observations. The results, except for
R2, would be identical to four separate logistic regressions because deal type is mutually
exclusive. Observations used here are those for which timing data is known and for
which one of the three main deal types listed is used.

Observing an early deal indicates an increase in probability that the deal will be a codevelopment deal by 35.5% (column 1) when compared to a late deal. Observing an
early deal decreases the probability that the deal will be a license or asset purchase,
compared to a late deal, by 13.8% and 7.1% respectively (columns 2 and 3).
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Analysis - Likelihood of Payment Types as a Function of Deal Type
The model now predicts that payment types will be predicted by deal type
{Payment(Deal(Timing(Rsize,e),e),e)}.

Again, due to the importance of some

unavailable data, payment types are predicted from observed deal types, which capture
the influence from the error terms from the prediction of timing.

Table 14 – Predictions of Marginal Effects from Logistic Regression of
Payment Type Dummy Variables On Deal Type Dummy Variables

Dependent Variable
Independent

Equity

Royalty

Milestone

Research

Upfront

Variables:
Co-development

+

+-

+

+

Asset Purchase

+-

-

-

-

+

Outsource

+-

-

+-

+

-

+

+-

+

+

-

Early Dummy

+-

Predictions in Table 14 are made against the omitted variables license deals and late
dummy. The model predicts that the regression of equity payments on deal type will
show that it is more likely to observe equity payments in co-development deals than any
other deal type. Equity is likely to be used when the value of the product is difficult to
measure ex-ante, so is more likely to be used in early deals, which is more likely to be a
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co-development deal. It is difficult to predict whether equity will be used more often in
license, asset purchase, or outsource deals. Each of these deal types are not predicted to
use equity payments in any systematic way, so significance of the results are predicted to
be low.

Royalty payments are expected to be used where the researcher maintains some residual
claim. This is most often the case in license deals. Co-development deals also contain a
royalty component to give an incentive to produce a viable product. The model presented
in this paper therefore predicts that licenses and co-development deals will be more likely
to be associated with royalty payments than outsource and asset purchase deals. Since
co-development deals are predicted to occur early, and license deals are predicted to
occur late, it is difficult to predict a sign for the coefficient of timing.

Milestone payments are predicted by the model to occur most often with co-development
deals. Co-development deals tend to be long-term deals which contract production which
is costly to measure and monitor. The model predicts that milestone payments tend to be
a good contractual tool to reduce monitoring costs. These payments may be used with
license deals also, but it is predicted to be seen much less often with asset purchases,
which should be associated with upfront payments. Outsource deals may also have a
milestone component, but because it is more likely to see a contracted research payment,
it is hard to predict whether it is more or less likely to see a milestone component with
outsource deals than license deals.

It is also difficult to predict whether milestone
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payments occur early or late, since these payments can be used with several deal types,
but the model predicts that these payments will tend to be early.

Research payments are predicted to be observed with outsource deals more often than
any other deal type.

These payments are not predicted to be observed with asset

purchases, and rarely observed with licenses. Outsource deals occur early, so the early
dummy should have a positive coefficient.

Upfront payments are expected to be used in asset purchase contracts more often than codevelopment, outsource, or license deals. Upfront payments are therefore predicted to
occur late. Because the seller maintains no residual claim when selling an asset, there
should be no payment which contractually obligates the seller to complete any future
work or receive any revenues after the initial cash payment. Because the upfront
component of an outsource deal is called a research payment, upfront payments are
predicted to occur less often with outsource deals. It is difficult to predict whether codevelopment deals, or the omitted variable, license deals, are more likely to contain an
upfront component.
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Table 15 - Marginal Effects from Logistic Regression of Payment Type Dummy
Variables on Deal Type Dummy Variables

Dependent Variable

Independent

Equity

Royalty

Milestone

Research

Upfront

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

0.175

-0.046

0.218

0.154

0.151

(0.018) b

(0.574)

(0.009) a

(0.000) a

(0.041) b

0.173

-0.162

-0.253

(0.131)

(0.103)

(0.016) b

0.056

No Obs

Variables:
Codevelopment
Asset Purchase

Outsource

(0.803)
Early Dummy

Observations
Pseudo R2

No Obs

0.246
(0.001) a

-0.070

0.606

(0.694)

(0.000) a

0.035

0.129

0.008

0.119

(0.568)

(0.083) c

(0.912)

(0.013) b

216

209

216

0.032

0.024

0.102

177
0.145

-0.399
(0.033) b
-0.140
(0.043) b

216
0.066

Notes: P-values are in parentheses, a=significantly different from zero at the 1% significance level. b= significantly different
from zero at the 5% significance level, c= significantly different from zero at the 10% significance level.

The model predicts that the payments used in a deal will be a function of the deal type.
The five logistic regressions in Table 15 are the regression of payment type dummy
variables only on deal type and timing dummy variables. I have included only deals for
which the deal type was co-development, license, asset purchase, or outsource, of which
there were 216. Some regressions have less than 216 observations in the cases that some
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observations were dropped due to perfect prediction of failure (no observations were
found for asset purchases and research payments occurring together, or for outsource
deals and royalty payments occurring together).

For these five regressions (1-5), I have dropped the independent dummy variable for
license deals.

Each regression presents the increase in probability, relative to the

excluded variable (license deal dummy variable), that the payment type will be observed
given that a certain deal type was observed. For example, the cell in the top left shows
that if a co-development deal is observed, it is 17.5% more likely that we will observe an
equity payment than if a license deal were observed.

The results agree with the predictions of the model. Notable results are that royalties are
predicted to occur early, due to so many early co-development deals using royalty
payments. Upfront payments are predicted to be used more often with co-development
deals than with license deals in this dataset.

Analysis – Acquisitions
The following logit in Table 16 tests the probability of an acquisition occurring. This is
done by comparing the attributes of acquisition deals to non-acquisitions deals. The
market cap of all firms in all deal types are included here, which is why the number of
observations of market cap seen in Table 16 are at most 164, whereas in table 11, I had at
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most 112 observations. The fact that 164 firms of each type10 had information available
on market cap is purely a coincidence, and not all of these observations overlap. Only 98
of these observations overlap. The “firm ratio” variable is the ratio of the potential
purchaser to potential acquired firm in each individual deal.

In the six logistic regressions of Table 16, I estimate the probability of an acquisition
occurring (where the dependent variable, acquisition deal dummy, equals one) compared
to an acquisition not occurring (acquisition dummy equal to zero). The marginal effects
therefore show the change in probability of an acquisition deal type occurring, given that
there is some marginal change in the market cap of one of the firms.

10

“firms of each type” refers to researchers and clients, which are referred to in the acquisitions section
as “potential acquired firms” and “potential purchasers.”

52

Table 16 – Marginal Effects of Logistic Regression of Acquisition Deal Type on
Market Cap

Dependent Variable: Acquisition Deal Dummy
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Independent Variable:
Potential Acquired Firm

-0.048

Market Cap

(0.154)

($10 billions)
Potential Purchasing Firm

0.043

1.34e-06

Market Cap

(0.423)

(0.058)

c

($100 billions)
-0.057

Log Potential Acquired

(0.000)

Market Cap

-0.081
a

(0.000)

-0.090
a

(0.000)

a

($millions)
Log Potential Purchasing

-0.010

0.004

Market Cap

(0.358)

(0.835)

($millions)

Observations
Pseudo R2

164
0.017

164

164

164

98

98

0.004

0.079

0.005

0.132

0.160

Notes: P-values are in parentheses, a=significantly different from zero at the 1% significance level. b= significantly different from
zero at the 5% significance level, c= significantly different from zero at the 10% significance level.

The marginal effects from the first logit (regression 1) show that as the potential
acquired firm’s market cap rises by $10 billion, it is 4.8% less likely to be involved in an
acquisition, which agrees with my hypothesis. The pseudo R2 and the significance level
are low, however. Logging the potential acquired firm’s market cap (regression 3) gives
a more significant result and higher R2, showing that this is not a linear relationship.
Adding logged potential purchaser market cap and ratio of potential purchaser market cap
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to logged potential acquired firm’s market cap (regression 5) brings the R2 to 0.132.
Using potential purchaser market cap rather than logged potential purchaser market cap
has more explanatory power, so in regression 6, this is used. Pseudo R2 is high, and
potential purchaser market cap, as well as the logged potential acquired firm’s market
cap, have significant results. In this regression, we are left with only 98 observations for
which all variables are available.

In regression 6, an increase in firm market cap of the purchaser of 100 billion dollars
increases the likelihood of observing an acquisition by 13.4*10 -5 %. In Table 17, we see
that the largest purchasers are over 200 billion dollars in market cap. With a marginal
effect this small, the purchaser’s size seems to play a very small role in the likelihood of
observing an acquisition deal.

The high significance of the log of the potential acquired firm’s market cap in regression
6 is evidence that a very small firm is more likely to be acquired. To be more specific, as
the size of the researcher rises by 100%, the probability of observing a firm being
acquired compared to not being acquired, but instead some other type of deal occurring,
falls by 9%.

Larger firms are less likely to be acquired than engage in another type of deal. There are
two reasons for seeing this result. First, it is expensive to acquire another firm, and the
larger the firm, the larger the opportunity cost of the capital invested in buying the other
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firm. The second reason is that a larger firm is more likely to have several projects going
on, many of which the purchaser may not be interested.

In the case of a larger

researching firm, the client may choose to purchase some specific assets of that firm
rather than the entire firm. This is the acquisition of some combination of human capital,
physical capital, and intellectual property.

Table 17 - Summary Statistics for Firms Involved in Acquisitions

Obs

Mean

Median

Stand

Min

Max

Dev
Purchaser

34

44709.22

13651.19

69341.35

12.759

269621.7
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2172.67

85.25

8435.93

1.5

52470.11

Market
Cap
Acquired
Market
Cap

Due to cost of capital, it is unlikely that a small firm would acquire a large firm. Of the
46 acquisitions in the dataset, 42 of the acquisitions were of biotechs, and 4 were of
pharma. Of those 4 pharma, 3 were acquired by another pharma, and one relatively small
pharma was acquired by a relatively large biotech. This is an acquisition of product
pipelines and human and physical capital. By acquiring the entire pipeline and all
licenses held by the acquired firm, the purchasing firm can ensure that they hold all
relevant information and future patents that would be put out by that firm. In the case
that the purchasing firm did not purchase the entire firm, but rather an asset from the
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firm, the researching firm may have residual research and human capital, providing the
ability to create new licenses that trump the old ones. The acquisition of the researcher
prevents this hazard. In addition, the purchase of the pipeline may add to the knowledge
base of the client firm, creating knowledge spillover.

Large firms may acquire the pipeline and intellectual property of smaller firms to use the
technology in multiple sectors of their development programs. Buying another firm’s
development program for one drug may prove profitable, depending on cost of capital
and economies of scope, but this technology may prove useful in other areas of the
purchasing firm’s production line. In this case, it may be profitable to buy the technology
of entire firm. The purchase of intellectual property from another firm may prevent the
need to reproduce that research and development in-house. Using a single technology in
multiple pipeline drugs or technologies could be compared to the use of one engine or
transmission in several cars by General Motors or Ford Motor Company. David Seltzer,
President and CEO of Hi-Tech Pharmacal, stated in a press release in Business wire on
December 31, 2007, that "This acquisition expands Hi-Tech's product line, broadens our
dosage form offerings, brings us into new therapeutic categories, adds to the Company's
growing pipeline of products and brings experienced management. We believe that the
acquisition will be accretive to earnings and cash flow positive in the first year."11

11

Recap.com, Hi-Tech Pharmacal Acquires Midlothian Laboratories - Dec 31, 2007 – Business wire
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CONCLUSION
With a sample of 270 strategic alliances, this research introduces a model to predict
efficient contracting of a strategic alliance’s timing, payment structure, and organization.
The model predicts that the size of the researching firm dictates its cost of capital, and a
high cost of capital will induce the researcher to sell the intellectual property sooner than
a larger researcher would. The timing of the deal is then used by the model to predict the
type of deal that will occur. Co-development and outsource deals will be observed to
occur early, while asset purchases and licenses will occur in late deals. The deal type
then carries some information about both the nature of the deal and the timing of the deal,
so payment types are predicted from deal type. Some combination of equity, royalty,
milestone, research, and upfront payments will be used to reduce the monitoring costs to
the client.

The model predicts that small researching firms, with high cost of capital, will be inclined
to form a co-development alliance with larger firms, which have lower costs of capital
but higher shirking costs. The small firm will efficiently produce research, and then sell
the intellectual property when the marginal cost of procuring capital has exceeded the
marginal benefit. The larger firm will finish late stage development and testing with low
cost capital, then take advantage of economies of scale and scope to cost effectively
manufacture, market and distribute the product. Larger client firms, with the lowest cost
of capital, will be more willing to undertake riskier (earlier stage) investments. Larger
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client firms will therefore be observed taking part in earlier deals with smaller researcher
firms.

In the case that the product is very hard to measure due to asymmetric information, or the
researching firm is very large, the product may not be sold until late phase testing or even
after approval. In this case, the deal type is more likely to be a license or asset purchase
rather than co-development. The differences between co-development and license or
asset purchases are timing of the deal and the payment types used. The payment types
used in co-development deals are chosen to align incentives in order to efficiently
produce research and development without incurring high monitoring costs. In license
and asset purchases, the products are complete or near complete, so monitoring payments
are not needed. Cash payments can be used to transfer the intellectual property from
researcher to client without leaving a residual claim to the researcher.

Paying the

researcher a royalty, however, provides incentive for the researcher to provide a valuable
product and reduces incentive for the researcher to create a better product, which would
devalue the one which was sold to the client.

Acquisitions are treated separately here due to the differing structure of the deal and lack
of a timing component. This deal type is used to fill gaps in a larger firm’s research
pipeline and solve a monitoring problem. In the case that a firm has gaps in its research
pipeline, it may choose to buy the pipeline from another firm.

This decreases the

purchaser’s inefficiency of holding idle resources or the buying and selling of human and
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physical capital. By acquiring the entire firm, the purchaser acquires all intellectual
property and human capital. This ends competition from that firm, decreasing probability
that the acquired pipeline will be trumped by a new product. When the researcher is a
small firm, it is relatively cheap to buy the entire firm. The analysis in this paper
illustrates that a larger researching firm is much less likely to be purchased.
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